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BALLOT PROPOSITIONS AND CAMPAIGN
FINANCE REFORM
RICHARD BRJFFAULT
For more than two decades, law and policy in the area of cam-
paign finance reform have been framed by the conflict between the
norms of promoting political equality and protecting political par-
ticipation. Viewing campaign finance as a basic component of
political activity, the Supreme Court has generally given political
participation priority over equality and has invalidated reforms that
would limit spending in order to promote equality.' The Court,
however, has sustained some restrictions on campaign finance ac-
tivities of candidates, political parties, and individuals and groups
who work with these political professionals.2 In effect, concern
about the capacity of private donations to corrupt officeholders has
mediated some of the tension between speech and equality and has
provided a justification for some reforms, such as disclosure rules
and contribution limits. As the 1996 election demonstrated, how-
ever, these efforts at reform have had relatively little effect in stem-
ming the flow of special interest money into candidate and party
coffers.3
Like campaign reform, the ballot initiative is intended to
weaken the power of special interests over government. Instead of
reducing the power of monied interests over elected officials, the
Richard Briffault, BA, 1974, Columbia UniversityJ.D., 1977, Hanard Univer-
sity, isJoseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, Director, Legislative Draft-
ing Research Fund, and Vice Dean, Columbia Law School. The author undertook
the research and writing of this article while a Visiting Fellow at the Taubman
Center for State and Local Government, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University during the 1996-1997 academic year. The author would like to thank
the Taubman Center for its support.
1. See Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election
Comm'n, 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996); Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conserva-
tive Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 1, 49, 56-57 (1976). But see Austin v. Michi-
gan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
2. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23-38 (1976) (upholding limits on
contributions to candidates and parties); California Med. Ass'n v. Federal Election
Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182 (1981) (upholding limitations on contributions to political
committees).
3. See, e.g., Rebecca Carr, As Soft Money Grows, So Does Controvesy, 54 CONG. Q.
WELY. RrP. 3272 (Nov. 16, 1996); Peter Stone, Tlw Green Wave, 28 NATLJ. 2415
(Nov. 9, 1996);Jonathan D. Salant, Spedal Report Finances Take Pdority in This Year's
Races, 54 CONG. Q. 3081 (Oct. 26, 1996).
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initiative curtails the role of elected officials by enabling the people
to make law directly, thus bypassing the corruptible legislature. Yet
today, as Professor Raskin demonstrates,4 the campaign finance ine-
qualities that characterize candidate elections mark initiative elec-
tions, too. However hard true campaign finance reform has been-
and continues to be-in the candidate context, it will be even more
difficult to achieve in ballot proposition elections.
The hallmark of direct democracy, and particularly of voter-
initiated measures,5 is the absence of candidates and party labels
from election campaigns. Initiative campaigns are typically
mounted by private individuals or groups, with many of the cam-
paign committees organized on an ad hoc basis to support or op-
pose a particular proposition. The Supreme Court has been, so far,
unwilling to accept limits on the campaign finance activities of pri-
vate interests, however monied they may be. Therefore, the central-
ity of nonpoliticians to initiative elections makes it more difficult to
secure reforms that limit the role of private money in ballot initia-
tive elections. Even if doctrine were to change to permit greater
regulation of campaign money in ballot proposition campaigns, the
relatively open nature of direct democracy would still make it more
difficult to implement many reforms-notjust contribution and ex-
penditure limits but also the provision of public funds that would
reduce the influence of private interest money.
I
THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE
REGULATION
The campaign finance area is shaped by the interplay of three
concerns: electoral communication, equality, and corruption. First,
meaningful elections presume extended political communication.
4. SeeJamin B. Raskin, Direct Democracy, Corporate Power and Judicial Review of
Popularly-Enacted Campaign Finance Reform, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 393, esp. at 394
("corporatization of direct democracy").
5. The broad term "direct democracy" includes three voting mechanisms: the
"initiative" permits a group of voters to initiate a law or a constitutional amend-
ment by placing a proposal on the ballot which is then submitted to the electorate
for approval or rejection; the "referendum" refers a proposed law to the voters for
approval or rejection after the legislature has acted; and the "recall" allows voters
to force a popular vote on whether an elected official is to be removed from office
before the conclusion of his or her term. Initiatives and referenda together are
referred to as "ballot propositions." See THOMAS E. CRONIN, DiRCTr DEMOCRACY:
THE POLmCS OF INrTATr, REFERENDUM, AND RECA.L 2 (1989). This Comment
focuses primarily on the "initiative," which permits popular lawmaking directly
without any involvement of elected officials.
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Candidates and others with an interest in the outcome of an elec-
tion need to be able to communicate their views to the voters.
More importantly, the legitimacy of decision-making by election-
what Professor Raskin calls a "[bet] on the enlightenment of the
majority of [the] people"6 -turns on the ability of voters to receive
the information they need to cast informed votes. Money is central
to the dissemination of information concerning candidates and is-
sues. Money is certainly not speech, but in a large and heterogene-
ous society it takes a considerable amount of money for anyone
interested in an election to communicate with the voters. There-
fore, the goal of protecting and promoting the dissemination of
political communication militates against restrictions on campaign
finances.
As a constitutional matter, the Supreme Court has determined
that government regulation of campaign money must be subject to
"the exacting scrutiny applicable to limitations on core First
Amendment rights of political expression." 7 Moreover, as a policy
matter, limits on campaign contributions and spending raise the
danger of limiting the information, ideas, and opinions available to
the voters-unless the limits are supplemented by public funds,
publicly provided communications, or regulations that reduce the
cost of campaigns.
Second, a central goal of campaign finance reformers has been
political equality." In this context, equality has had two meanings.
One emphasizes the equal treatment of opposing candidates or op-
posing sides in a ballot proposition election. As a basic element of
electoral fairness, candidates and opposing points of view should be
able to contest elections with each other on a relatively equal basis.
If one candidate, or one side in a ballot proposition election,
spends far more than the other, the voters are likely to hear far
more information from the former than the latter. This smacks of
unfairness and casts doubt over whether the electorate's decision is
a properly informed one.9
The other strand of equality concerns the equal influence of
voters on electoral outcomes. Each voter has just one vote. But if
6. Raskin, supra note 4, at 402.
7. Buckley, 424 U.S. 1, 44 (1976).
8. See, e.g.,John S. Shockley, Direct Democray, Campaign Finane, and the Courts:
Can Corruption, Undue Influence, and Declining Voter Confidence Be Found?, 39 U.
NfIAu L. REv. 377, 382 (1985).
9. See, e.g., Raskin, supra note 4, at 400; Daniel H. Lowenstein, Campaign
Spending and Ballot Propositions: Recent Experiences, Public Choice Themy, and the First
Amendment, 29 UCLA L. REv. 505, 515 (1982).
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monied interests spend hundreds of thousands of dollars in con-
nection with campaigns, these interests may have a greater influ-
ence on the outcome of elections than those with fewer dollars to
spend. Drawing on an analogy to the "one person, one vote" rule
in legislative apportionment, some commentators have urged an
"equal-dollars-per-voter" principle to equalize the financial influ-
ence of voters on election outcomes. 10
The two versions of equality do not necessarily go together. In
an election in which one side starts out with far more popular sup-
port than the other, "equal-dollars-per-voter" could result in wildly
unequal spending if each voter were empowered to make an equal
financial contribution and then gave money to the side that en-
joyed the voter's initial support. Conversely, equal financing of can-
didates or opposing positions in a ballot election could be achieved
by a small number of wealthy donors bankrolling each candidate or
side. Nor is money the only factor that ought to be considered in
appraising candidate equality. In many elections one candidate-
the incumbent-starts out far better known, with greater access to
the media, and with the opportunity to use government resources
to his or her advantage. Thus, limiting spending in the name of
equalization may make it more difficult for challengers to take on
incumbents.1" Nonetheless, these notions of candidate equality
and equality of influence over electoral outcomes have strong
claims in our political culture and lie behind many reform
proposals.
Third, campaign finance may affect the behavior of govern-
ment after or, more accurately, between elections. When most can-
didates are dependent on private donations, large donors and
prospective large donors may enjoy special leverage over elected
officials. Donors can obtain special access to officeholders, and
their views may carry extra weight. They will, therefore, be particu-
larly well positioned to affect legislation and regulation. This is less
a matter of outright bribery or formalized deals, and more a matter
of the subtle ways in which big donors may make their interests
known and their influence felt. Such special interest influence is
difficult to measure, detect, or police. To the extent that depen-
10. See, e.g., Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter A Constitutional Principle of
Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1204 (1994).
11. Although equalized spending could limit the ability of little-known chal-
lengers to catch up with well-known incumbents, this problem tends to be more
theoretical than real. In most elections, the incumbent is able to raise and spend
far more money than challengers. See, e.g., HERBET E. ALEXANDER & ANTH omy
CoRRADo, FINANCJNG THE 1992 ELECrION 195-96 (1995).
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dence on large private donations causes an officeholder to place
donor interests ahead of public interest in the course of his or her
discharge of official duties, large private donations are a source of
corruption.
It has been suggested that the prevention of corruption is not a
distinct concern but is, instead, merely "derivative" of the deeper
question of inequality.12 Certainly, the existence of great inequali-
ties of wealth means that some people or interests have the capacity
to "corrupt" officeholders while others do not. The possibility of
outspending the opposition-and the fear that the opposition will
outspend one's own candidacy-drives the feverish pursuit of po-
tentially corrupting private contributions. Rhetorically, the con-
cerns of "inequality" and "corruption" may be melded by language
that speaks of the corrupting effect of special interest spending on
the political process as a whole.
Nevertheless, the concern about candidate corruption ad-
dresses a problem different from that posed by either unequal cam-
paign spending or unequal influence over electoral outcomes. I
suspect that what bothers voters about the fund-raising scandals
that rocked the final weeks of the 1996 presidential campaign's was
not the possibility that illicit donations gave President Clinton an
unfair advantage over Bob Dole or Ross Perot, or gave Clinton's
donors an undue influence over the outcome of the election.
Rather, voters are concerned that donors won private meetings with
the President and other members of his administration, with the
possibility of unspecified benefits and favors in return for their
funds.14 There is a natural apprehension that the President may
have made certain decisions based on the donors' interests rather
than his own conception of the public interest-in other words,
that he was "corrupted."
In fashioning doctrine in this area, the Supreme Court has
given primacy to the value of electoral communication. Starting
with Buckley v. Valeo,15 the Court has developed campaign finance
case law entirely under the rubric of the First Amendment. Pro-
12. See David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality; and Campaign inazce Reform, 94
COLUM. L. REv. 1369, 1370 (1994).
13. See, eg., Michael Isikoff & Melinda Liu, Scandak Now, the Taiwan Axis,
NsvWF, Nov. 4, 1996, at 32; Howard Feinman & Mark Hosenball, The Asian
Connection, NEwswEEK , Oct. 28, 1996, at 24-28.
14. Similar concerns have been raised by the fund-raising practices of Con-
gressional Republicans. See Don VanNatta,Jr. &Jane Fritch, $250,000 Buys Donors
Best Access to Congress, N.Y. TmEs, Jan. 27, 1997, at Al.
15. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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ceeding from the assumption that "the concept that government
may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to
enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment,"16 the Court has subordinated political equality in or-
der to protect unfettered campaign communication in almost every
case in which the two values conflict.
The Court, however, has recognized that the prevention of cor-
ruption can provide a basis for some campaign finance regulation.
In a sense, the notion of "corruption" has mediated the conflict
between unlimited spending by monied interests on political com-
munication and the goal of greater political equality in a Court
bent on preferring the former to the latter. When the Court is per-
suaded that a campaign finance practice raises a question of private
interest corruption of officeholders, it may sustain a restriction. 17
Thus, the Court has upheld limitations on the amount of money a
donor can give to a candidate, to all candidates in an election cycle,
and to organizations that give donations to candidates.18 Such con-
tributions may be restricted because they do not directly entail the
expression of political views19 and because they raise the danger of
corruption: "To the extent that large contributions are given to se-
cure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office
holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy is
undermined."20
16. Id. at 48-49.
17. See, e.g., id. at 26-29.
18. See id. at 23-38; California Med. Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453
U.S. 182 (1981) (upholding certain limitations on donations to political commit-
tees for multiple candidates). Although an individual's contribution to a political
action committee raises little question of the donor's corruption of that organiza-
tion, such donations may be restricted to prevent donors from using intermediary
organizations to avoid limits on contributions to candidates.
19. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21. According to the Court, "[a] contribution
serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views, but does
not communicate the underlying basis for the support." Id. The expressive com-
ponent of a contribution "rests solely on the undifferentiated, symbolic act of con-
tributing." Id. In contrast, the size of the contribution "does not increase
perceptibly" with the quantity of the contributor's communication. Id. "While
contributions may result in political expression if spent by a candidate or an associ-
ation to present views to the voters, the transformation of contributions into polit-
ical debate involves speech by someone other than the contributor." Id.
20. Id. at 26-27. The Court has also upheld reporting and disclosure require-
ments, reasoning that they may provide voters useful information concerning can-
didates' financial backers and discourage corruptive donations, without actually
limiting campaign communications. See id. at 64-68. Where a minor political party
can demonstrate that reporting and disclosure requirements may chill contribu-
tions that do not present dangers of corruption, the Court has been willing to
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By contrast, spending on direct communications with voters
has been held to entail core political speech.21 When undertaken
by candidates directly, or by noncandidates acting independently of
a candidate's campaign, such spending has been held to present no
danger of corrupting candidates.22 The justifications for restricting
such expenditures are egalitarian-to equalize the influence of can-
didates and interest groups on electoral outcome-and those have
been deemed insufficient to support a restriction on campaign fi-
nance activities.23 As a result, the Court has invalidated restrictions
on spending by candidates24 and independent committees,5 in-
cluding party committees acting independently of their
candidates.26
The one exception to the general hostility to expenditure re-
strictions occurred in 1990 in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Com-
merce,27 in which the Court upheld a state law restricting
expenditures by business corporations in connection with a candi-
date election. The Court found that a state could justify such a law
as necessary to control "the corrosive and distorting effects of im-
mense aggregations of wealth" which could "unfhirly influence elec-
tions when deployed in the form of independent
expenditures." 28 Austin hinted at a broader notion of corruption-
not just that private donations might corrupt candidates, but that
unlimited corporate spending aimed at influencing electoral out-
comes might corrupt the integrity of the political process itself.
The significance of Austin, however, is limited by the Court's
focus on the assertedly unique dangers posed by corporations. Ac-
cording to the Court, corporations enjoy a unique state-conferred
invalidate the application of those requirements to the organization. Sre Brown v.
Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87 (1982).
21. See Bukey, 424 U.S. at 19-20.
22. See id. at 47,51-55; Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Pol.
Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1984).
23. See Bu/ley, 424 U.S. at 48-49 (rejecting the equalization of the relative
abilities of individuals and groups to affect electoral outcomes as a basis for limit-
ing spending); i& at 56-57 (rejecting the equalization of the financial resources of
candidates as a basis for limiting spending).
24. See id. at 51-54 (invalidating limits on candidates' use of personal or family
wealth); id. at 54-58 (invalidating limits on candidates' use of campaign
expenditures).
25. See i& at 39-51.
26. See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election
Comm'n, 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996).
27. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
28. I. at 660.
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status that enables them to accumulate large sums of money.2 9
Limits on corporations are justifiable "to ensure that substantial ag-
gregations of wealth amassed by the special advantages which go
with the corporate form of organization ... [are not] converted
into political 'war chests'....
Austin and business corporations31 aside, the Court in its deci-
sionss2 has generally distinguished the prevention of corruption
from the promotion of equality. The Court has also defined cor-
ruption in terms of the favors that donors may obtain from office-
holders rather than the undue influence monied interests may have
over electoral outcomes. Under the current constitutional regime,
the only ways to promote equality in spending are: the provision of
public funds to candidates or voters; regulation of media advertis-
ing rates to reduce campaign costs; or other government programs
that might disseminate election information and thereby indirectly
assist candidates with fewer financial resources. Candidates may be
required to limit their expenditures as a condition for the receipt of
public funds-although candidates cannot be required to accept
public funds and the attendant spending limits. Even the provision
of public funds to candidates cannot provide a basis for the imposi-
tion of limits on spending by independent committees.33 With elec-
toral communication at the heart of the Court's campaign finance
jurisprudence, equality may be promoted by "leveling up" the re-
sources available to less affluent candidates or voters but not by "lev-
eling down" the ability of monied interests or individuals to devote
their own financial resources to elections.
29. See id. at 659-60.
30. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S.
197, 207 (1982).
31. In Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Lifre, 479 U.S. 238
(1986), the Court held that restrictions on corporate political activity could not
constitutionally be applied to entities that, although corporate in form, were or-
ganized for ideological purposes and did not garner their funds from business
activities. See id. at 263-64.
32. In dicta in other cases, the Court, or individual justices, raised the possibil-
ity that the undue influence accruing to monied interests may constitute "corrup-
tion." See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Citizens
Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 301 (1981) (Marshall, J.,
concurring); id. at 302-03 (Blackmun, J. and O'Connor, J., concurring). In
neither case did the Court find evidence of such undue influence.
33. See Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action
Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1984).
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BUCKLEY V VALEO AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE
REFORM IN ELECTIONS WITHOUT
CANDIDATES
The Supreme Court set the terms for campaign finance regula-
tion in the ballot proposition context in two leading casesa 4 Frst
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti 5 and Citizens Against Rent Control
(CARC) v. City of Berkeley.36 In Bellotti, the Court invalidated a state
law barring corporations from engaging in campaign expenditures
in connection with a ballot proposition.3 7 In CARC, the Court in-
validated limits on contributions to campaign committees in ballot
proposition elections.3 8 Bellotti and CARC suggest that, for the
Court, ballot proposition elections are categorically different from
candidate elections for campaign finance purposes since restric-
tions similar to those invalidated in these two cases have been up-
held in the candidate context. Austin sustained restrictions on
corporate spending in a candidate election, and Buckley upheld lim-
its on contributions to candidate campaign committees.3 9 The
Court's hostility to restrictions on either contributions or direct ex-
penditures in the initiative context follows from the logic of
Buckley.40
Ballot proposition elections differ from other elections: candi-
dates and party labels are absent from the ballot, replaced by pro-
posed statutes and constitutional amendments. This eliminates
potential corruption of officeholders as ajustification for imposing
limitations on campaign finance activities. At the same time, it in-
creases the value of information contained in campaign communi-
cations for voters.
Donations to committees that mount ballot proposition cam-
paigns raise little danger df corrupting officeholders, as such com-
34. A third case dealing with the role of money in direct democracy is Meer v.
Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988), in which the Court invalidated a Colorado law forbid-
ding the use of paid circulators for initiative petitions. Meyer is entirely consistent
with the anti-restriction thrust of the other leading cases, but since it deals with the
process by which initiative measures are placed on the ballot rather than the initia-
tive election campaign itself, Meyer will not be discussed here.
35. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
36. 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
37. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 767.
38. See Citizens Against Rent Contrr; 454 U.S. at 299-300.
39. See also California Med. Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182
(1981) (upholding restrictions on contributions to political action committee
formed to give contributions to candidates).
40. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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mittees are generally organized and run by private citizens and do
not involve elected representatives. A particular ballot proposition
campaign may, of course, serve the electoral interests of a particular
candidate, and monied interests may on occasion be able to create
political debts by spending in connection with a direct democracy
election.41 But such campaigns are uncommon. Candidates for of-
fice and political parties generally play little or no role in ballot
proposition elections.42 Thus, donations to initiative campaigns, or
direct expenditures in connection with ballot propositions, rarely
pose a danger of corrupting elected officials since there is no one
to corrupt in such elections. 43
By the same token, the absence of candidates and parties in-
creases the importance of campaign communications. In candidate
races, the voter often enters the election season with some knowl-
edge about the candidates. There is usually an incumbent whose
record of voting decisions, official actions, personality, character,
and, increasingly, private life have been the subject of media re-
ports. The challenger may also be an officeholder or a locally
prominent person whose public and private activities have received
media coverage. Voters are likely to have some sense of the well-
being of the community during the incumbent's tenure, which can
be used as a basis for deciding whether or not to return the incum-
bent to office. Even when the voter knows little about the candi-
date's record, the candidate's name may tell the voter something-
such as ethnicity or sex-that may be relevant to the voting deci-
sion. Additionally, candidates are usually the nominees of parties.
Many voters are registered in parties, and party nomination may be
important in their voting decisions. Even for independent voters,
the candidate's party affiliation is an important "cue," suggesting to
them what a candidate's views are likely to be on a range of issues.
This information-incumbency, past performance, character,
party, and ethnic identity-supplied either by the ballot itself and/
or by the media in the years preceding the election, is missing when
initiatives are on the ballot.
41. See Shockley, supra note 8, at 386.
42. See, e.g., BTrrY H. ZISK, MONEY, MEDIA, AND THE GRASSROOTS: STATE BAL-
LOT IssuEs AND THE EticTORArI PROCESS 102, 161 (1987).
43. In addition, the absence of candidates eliminates the argument that ex-
penditure restrictions may be justified as protecting representatives from the diver-
sion of their time from official duties to fundraising. For a forceful development
of this argument, see Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-Raising:
Why Campaign Spending Limits May Not Violate the First Amendment After All, 94
COLUM. L. REv. 1281 (1994).
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Yet, even as voters enter the election season with less informa-
tion about ballot propositions than about candidates, they need to
know much more. In candidate elections, voters are asked to de-
cide who is to hold a particular office for a term. The voters need
not resolve any particular dispute over public policy; their elected
representatives will do that for them. They must, however, decide
which candidate is to be entrusted with authority to act and base
this decision on a general appraisal of the candidate's competence,
ideology, past behavior, character, and other factors. By contrast,
ballot propositions involve the direct resolution of legislative or
constitutional issues. Indeed, the question before the voters is not
simply a matter of setting general policy guidance-such as
whether or not to cut taxes, curtail affirmative action, or regulate
insurance-but is a very specific, often quite technical, and fre-
quently ambiguous proposal.44 A ballot question dealing with taxes
requires the voter to decide whether to limit a specific tax, at a spe-
cific level, and with a specific provision for waiver.45 Similarly, an
insurance reform initiative requires consideration of a complex set
of rules governing insurance terms and conditions. In many cam-
paigns, determining exactly what the proposition provides may be
an issue. For example, in the 1996 vote on term limits in New York
City, the issue was not whether to have term limits, but how many
terms a city council member could serve; when the limits would
take effect; and whether the ballot proposition would stagger term
limits to avoid the imposition of term limits on all council members
at one time.46
Admittedly, some ballot questions are relatively straightforward
and involve matters about which most voters have strongly held be-
liefs that predate the election campaign. In those elections, cam-
paign communications may not play an important role. But such
elections are the ones least in need of finance reform.
More frequently, the ballot question wil be complex and the
public's views unfocused. In these cases, the electorate wvill need a
44. As a leading scholar of direct democracy has pointed out, "because ballot
propositions often deal with complex issues, it is important to differentiate be-
tween the voters' knowledge about the broad issue involved and their knowledge
about the proposition itself." DAVID MAGLEBY, DriRar LEGISMON: VO6nNC ON
BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITD STATES 140 (1984).
45. As Zisk notes, "an amazing number" of ballot propositions concerning
taxes "dealt with highly specific subjects, such as tax exemptions for swine (Geor-
gia), urban renewal (Florida and Virginia), disabled veterans (Virginia), and solar
energy (Georgia and Nebraska)." ZisK, supra note 42, at 18.
46. Paul Moses, Term Limits Making Repeat Appearance, N.Y. TMtEs, Oct. 29,
1996, at A7.
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great deal of very specific information in order to cast informed
ballots. The major sources of information are likely to be individu-
als and organizations interested in persuading the voters to support
or oppose the proposition. Very little information comes from neu-
tral sources. Unlike candidate elections, in which a candidate's
name and party affiliation may provide voting cues, the ballot itself
provides little information.47 Media analysis of ballot measures is
usually skimpy.48 As one scholar has noted, "media coverage, even
in good state newspapers, is typically thin and late. '49 Endorse-
ments by public officials and other prominent figures can give the
voters some guidance, but for many initiatives, public officials strive
to avoid taking a stand.5 0 Similarly, the political parties rarely be-
come involved in ballot proposition contests.5 1 Although many
states provide voters with pamphlets or handbooks summarizing
the initiatives and presenting brief "pro" and "con" arguments,
most analysts have concluded that voter pamphlets fail to provide
much useful information to the majority of voters.5 2
As a result, voters in direct democracy elections are highly de-
pendent on the communications of campaign participants for the
information that will enable them to decide how to vote.63 Under
these circumstances, the burden on those who would limit cam-
paign contributions and expenditures is particularly heavy.
Some commentators have tried to minimize the communica-
tive value of the ads characteristic of ballot proposition campaigns.
47. Indeed, in some states the proposition itself does not appear on the bal-
lot. See Richard B. Collins & Dale Oesterle, Governing by Initiative: Structuring the
Ballot: Initiative Procedures That Do and Don't Work, 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 47, 94-95
(1995) (noting that in Colorado, neither a summary nor the language of the initia-
tive appears on the ballot).
48. See ZisK, supra note 42, at 153; MAGLEBY, supra note 44, at 158-65.
49. CRONIN, supra note 5, at 83.
50. ZisK, supra note 42, at 102-03.
51. Zisk refers to the "near-irrelevance of parties for state ballot controver-
sies." ZIsK, supra note 42, at 238. In her survey of 72 ballot proposition measures
in four states over a six-year period, she found that partisanship played a role in
only two cases, one of which was a referendum on reapportionment initiated by
the California Republican party. See id. at 237.
52. See, e.g., ZIsK, supra note 42, at 153 ("[T]he ballot pamphlets... are writ-
ten at a level beyond the ready comprehension of the average reader."); MAGLEDY,
supra note 44, at 136-39; Lowenstein, supra note 9, at 604-06. But cf. CRONIN, supra
note 5, at 80-82 (finding voter pamphlets useful to many voters, but acknowledging
the need for better design and preparation).
53. See, e.g, CRONIN, supra note 5, at 83, 120; MAGLEBY, supra note 44, at 168
("[I]n the absence of the party cue, voters are more dependent on the two sides to
simplify the choice and help organize the electoral decision.").
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Scholars of direct democracy have repeatedly asserted that cam-
paign communications have been "deceptive, superficial, [or] irrel-
evant,"5 4 with more attention devoted to "peripheral and indeed
distracting issues" 55 than to the content and likely impact of the
proposition on the ballot. This is not simply attributable to a lack of
funds. Well-funded campaigns are often the worst offenders, bom-
barding voters with information that is simplistic, confusing, and
sometimes "deliberately misleading."56 In fact, additional spending
often merely compounds voter confusion 5 7 Even in the absence of
restrictions on initiative campaign spending, most voters enter the
voting booth ill-informed about the questions on the ballotr A
sizable percentage of voters actually cast mistaken ballots-voting
for the position that is contrary to their policy preferences.59
Indeed, in reviewing literature on the subject, it seems that the
critics are often more concerned with the confusing and deceptive
quality of the messages disseminated by well-funded campaigns
than with the inequality in spending per se. This creates the impli-
cation that the only problem with spending inequalities is their fa-
cilitation of deceptive ads.60 Professor Lowenstein has suggested
that heavy, one-sided spending is able to rely on deception only
because the other side lacks funds to rebut misstatements.61 How-
ever, Professor Zisk has shown that campaigns in which both sides
are equally endowed are just as likely to "degenerat[e] into confu-
sion and deception."62 "[T]wo heavy spenders may simply cause
twice the confusion of one rather than one forcing the other to
confront the-real issues."63
Whether or not one-sided spending is primarily associated with
deceptive campaigning, it is hard to see how the poor quality of
ballot campaign ads provides a basis for reducing the constitutional
status of initiative campaign speech. Ballot proposition ads may be
more confusing than enlightening, but, so long as they refrain from
degenerating into outright falsehoods, they should continue to en-
joy constitutional protection. Reference to their poor quality will
54. Lowenstein, supra note 9, at 517.
55. Zisi, supra note 42, at 131.
56. Id. at 246.
57. Id. at 136.
58. See, ag., Julian Eule, Judidal Review of Dirct Deynocrat,, 99 YALE LJ. 1503,
1516 (1990).
59. See id. at 1517; CRONI, supra note 5, at 74.
60. See, &g., Lowenstein, supra note 9, at 611.
61. Id. at 517.
62. ZisK, supra note 42, at 131.
63. Id. at 154-55.
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do little to bolster the case for regulation; indeed, to the extent that
the desire to limit the amount of spending is driven by a concern
about ad content, the possibility of sustaining spending restrictions
may actually be reduced. Of course, even unlimited spending may
do little to educate voters as to what the real issues are in a particu-
lar ballot measure. But, given the voters' enormous need for more
information, it would be difficult to come up with a "speech" basis
for limiting even one-sided campaign spending.
With candidate corruption unavailable as ajustification for reg-
ulation in this area, and the need for information just as strong in
the initiative-elections context, the case for restrictions on ballot
proposition campaign financial activities must rest entirely on egali-
tarian concerns. Both the issues of unfair contests and undue influ-
ence of monied interests are present in the ballot-proposition
context. Moreover, due to the absence of candidates and parties,
unequal spending may play a greater role in affecting electoral out-
comes for initiatives than for candidates. 64 This is the flipside of
the important role played by campaign communications in initia-
tive elections. If campaign communications matter more, then dif-
ferences in the amount of communications, reflecting differences
in the level of financial support for each side, should have a greater
impact on electoral outcomes.
Of course, money is not always dispositive in either candidate
or initiative elections. Long standing opinions, grass-roots interest
groups, campaign strategies,65 even the placement of the measure
on the ballot 66 and the number and content of other ballot pro-
64. See, e.g., CRONIN, supra note 5, at 83, 215. Professor Lowenstein asserts
that the disparities in ballot measure elections are much greater than in candidate
elections. This is due, he suggests, to the absence of parties and the standing sup-
port that both parties are likely to enjoy, and to the absence of an "investment
incentive" for interest groups to donate to both sides in a ballot proposition fight.
In candidate elections, many interests groups are concerned less with which candi-
date wins and more with having access to the ultimate winner once he or she takes
office. Consequently, these groups may contribute to more than one candidate.
By contrast, in an initiative election, there is no question of access to the winner. If
a person or organization has an interest in the election, it will be on only one side
of the issue. See Lowenstein, supra note 9, at 589 & n.314.
Although Professor Lowenstein's notion of the absence of an investment in-
centive in initiative elections seems sound, his data does not demonstrate that one-
sided spending is more common in initiative than in candidate elections. In addi-
tion, his analysis does not take into account the many candidate races, such as
those involving incumbents from "safe" districts and/or holding powerful commit-
tee chairmanships, in which interest groups "invest" in only one side.
65. See CRONIN, supra note 5, at 99-100.
66. See Shockley, supra note 8, at 397-98.
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positions67 can affect the fate of a particular ballot measure. Never-
theless, when a ballot question deals with a matter about which
most voters lack strongly held views, then, in the absence of party
cues and candidate factors, campaign expenditures are likely to
have a larger impact in initiative elections. 6a
Unequal spending appears to affect initiative elections differ-
ently than candidate elections. Some critics of spending limits in
candidate elections have asserted that limits are pro-incumbent be-
cause they can prevent challengers from amassing the funds
needed to take on entrenched incumbents; 69 in practice, however,
incumbents typically outraise and outspend their challengers. 70
Spending inequality in candidate races tends to reflect and rein-
force the advantages incumbents enjoy, compounding rather than
offsetting the incumbency bias characteristic of many American
elections. It is this incumbency bias, more than spending inequality
per se, that frequently erodes the fairness of elections. Indeed,
spending inequality in candidate elections raises the special danger
that officeholders will be able to perpetuate themselves in power.
In initiative elections, by contrast, spending inequality does not
seem to correlate with one side or the other; that is, there is no
evidence that "yes" votes typically outspend "no" votes or vice versa.
Instead, the significance of spending inequality appears to turn on
whether one is substantially outspending the other. Heavy spend-
ing in favor of a proposition does not make it much more likely that
the proposition will pass; heavy spending on the negative side does
make it much more likely that the measure will fail. 7 1
Heavy one-sided negative spending seems to reinforce a mod-
est general "negative bias in initiative voting."72 Voters tend to de-
feat more voter-initiated measures than they approve, reflecting
perhaps a basic conservatism and resistance to change. 73 The pro-
pensity to vote "no" on initiatives seems to be more modest than the
67. See ZisK, supra note 42, at 107.
68. In Zisk's study, "campaign expenditures are the single most powerful pre-
dictor of the vote." Id. at 90.
69. See, e.g., DAVID B. MAGLEBY & CANDicEJ. NELSON, THE MoNY CHASE: Cm.
GRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN FnANcE RFxoni 162, 171-73 (1990).
70. See, e.g., ALEXANDER & CoRRADo, supra note 11, at 192, 195.
71. See Lowenstein, supra note 9; CRONIN, supra note 5, at 109; Shockley, supra
note 8, at 397-98.
72. MAGLEBY, supra note 44, at 167.
73. See David R. Lagasse, Undue Influence: Corporate Polfitcal Spe&ch, Power and
the Initiative Process, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1347, 1395 (1995).
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propensity to re-elect incumbents in candidate elections,7" but
there is no particular propensity across ballot measures for one
side, such as the "no" side, to raise more money than the other.
Unequal spending in candidate elections tends to result in the
return of incumbents to office, whereas unequal spending in initia-
tive elections tends to result in an increase in the number of ballot
propositions defeated. It could be argued that both consequences
subvert the election in question. The possibility of being voted out
of office is intended to make officeholders more responsive to their
constituents, or to enable their constituents to replace incumbents
who diverge too far from constituent preferences. The initiative
was intended to enable the electorate to circumvent the legisla-
ture-and the monied interests who were believed to dominate the
legislature-and make law direcdy.75 Heavy one-sided negative
spending makes it more difficult for initiative proponents to get
their measures enacted into law or added to their state constitu-
tions. To that extent, one-sided spending can frustrate the very
purpose of the initiative.
Yet, the American tradition has placed the highest priority on
restraining public power and preventing tyranny. By reinforcing
the power of incumbency, unequal spending in candidate elections
threatens the very bedrock of democratic self-government-the
ability of the people to vote officeholders out of office. By contrast,
one-sided negative spending resembles one-sided legislative lobby-
ing-it skews the political process for the benefit of those with great
wealth, but it does not strengthen the ability of those in office to
hold power. Given the skepticism of some critics about the wisdom
of voter-initiated legislation,76 reducing the number of initiatives
passed might not be such a bad thing. I doubt, however, that even
critics of the initiative think that one-sided negative spending is the
best way to screen out undesirable initiatives. The power of one-
sided, negative spending to defeat initiatives is really a restatement
of the inequality concern-that monied interests have undue influ-
ence over electoral outcomes, even if only on the negative side.
The extra factor present in candidate elections-that unequal
74. See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 9, at 550 (observing that of 26 California
initiatives studied, seven, or 27% were approved, and 19, or 73% were defeated;
only 38% of initiatives that benefited from significant one-sided spending passed,
although even fewer (11%) of initiatives opposed by significant one-sided spend-
ing passed).
75. ZISK, supra note 42, at 193.
76. See Eule, supra note 58.
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spending reinforces the power of officeholders-is absent in the
initiative setting.77
Even if the consequences of unequal initiative spending lead-
ing to the defeat of more initiatives were taken to be as serious as
the consequences of unequal candidate spending reinforcing the
power of incumbency, the latter concern has not yet been a basis
forjudicial validation of campaign finance limits. So long as candi-
dates are formally equal in the ability to raise and spend money, the
Court has not recognized that the campaign finance system favors
one candidate over another or that it undermines the utility of elec-
tions in keeping officeholders accountable to the electorate. That
being the case, it is unlikely that the Court would be moved by a
showing that the potential for one-sided negative spending will
make it harder for initiative measures to be adopted.
Given the absence of the concern over candidate corruption,
ballot propositions pose a sharper instance of the conflict between
speech and equality than candidate elections. Since Buddey, con-
flicts between speech and equality have generally been resolved
against equality.78 Austin may provide a basis for more rigorous
campaign finance regulation by broadening the notion of corrup-
tion to include not simply the impact of donations on candidates,
but also the undue influence monied interests can wield over elec-
toral outcomes.7 9 But Austin's significance for promoting cam-
paign reform in the ballot proposition context is limited for three
reasons.
First, Austin appears to be a rule for candidate elections only,
given Bellotti's prior invalidation of limits on corporate spending in
ballot proposition elections. Austin did not say much about Bellotti,
and its concern about the undue influence of money over electoral
77. Moreover, even though one-sided negative spending can limit the ability
of the initiative to achieve direct law-making, it is not clear that increasing the
number of initiatives defeated completely frustrates the initiative as a mechanism
for popular influence over the political process. One-sided negative spending typi-
cally occurs only after an initiative measure has actually qualified for the ballot. At
that point, the subject of the initiative has been added to the political agenda.
Even if the initiative is defeated on election day, the initiative mechanism may have
the effect of eventually forcing elected officials to come to grips with the issue that
has been the subject of the ballot proposition. See ZisK supra note 42, at 251, 257
(discussing the role of the initiative in enlarging the public agenda and forcing
action on topics ignored by the legislature). Given the lack of informed delibera-
tion in many initiative campaigns, the initiative might in fact play a more beneficial
role if its principal effect were to broaden the legislative agenda rather than dis-
place the legislature outright.
78. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
79. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 668-69 (1990).
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outcomes ought to be as applicable to ballot proposition elections
as to candidate elections. But Austin clearly refrained from overrul-
ing the older case.80 The two cases together, thus, establish a sharp
differentiation of campaign reform jurisprudence based on
whether the election concerns candidates or initiatives.
Second, Austin authorizes limitations on the spending of cor-
porations only. The role of the state in giving special advantages to
corporations was central to the decision's rationale.8' The Court
treated corporations as though they were the recipients of public
funds in finding that the state could make the benefits of the corpo-
rate form contingent upon limitations on the corporation's polit-
ical activity. This does not bode well for the extension of Austin to
other political spenders. Yet corporations are not the only source
of unequal initiative expenditures. Labor unions, particularly pub-
lic employee unions,8 2 trade associations, ideological groups, 3 and
wealthy individuals have all played important roles in financing bal-
lot proposition campaigns.8 4 Noncorporate spending can be just as
80. Austin cited Bellotti's prior determination that corporate political speech is
protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 657. It also cited, without comment,
Belotti's prior differentiation of candidate and ballot proposition elections. See id.
at 659 (citing First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788 n.26 (1978)).
81. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 658-59. The logic of Austin is quite shaky on this
point. In Bellotti, its first case dealing with corporate political spending, the Court
emphasized that the touchstone for analysis was "[t]he inherent worth of the
speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public.., not the identity of its
source, whether corporation, association, union or individual." Bellotti, 435 U.S. at
777. The corporate status of the speaker, then, ought to be irrelevant to an assess-
ment of the basis for regulating the speech. In particular, it is hard to see how
state-granted advantages make corporate speech more corrupting than political
speech by other monied speakers. Moreover, as Justice Scalia pointed out in his
Austin dissent, corporations are not alone in receiving special advantages from the
state. Austin, 494 U.S. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Nor are corporations unique
in their ability to divert wealth obtained in the economic marketplace to political
purposes. Other business associations, as well as wealthy individuals who benefit
from inheritance laws or obtain their wealth through investments in corporations,
may build up campaign war chests that have "little or no correlation to the public's
support for the[ir] . .. political ideas." Id. at 660.
82. See, e.g., ZIsK, supra note 42, at 241; CRONIN, supra note 5, at 115. For a
recent example of an initiative drive financed primarily by unions, see Michelle
Nicolosi, Even Experts Can't Diagnose HMO Initiatives, ORAN(cE COUrNm REQ., Nov. 3,
1996, at A22 (describing anti-HMO initiatives financed primarily by service em-
ployees international union and California Nurses Association).
83. See Shockley, supra note 8, at 427 n.197.
84. In New York City, the recent campaign to defeat a ballot proposition that
would defer term limits, as well as the earlier campaign that saw a term limits
initiative win popular approval, was largely bankrolled by one wealthy individual.
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influential as corporate spending in initiative elections.8 Indeed, a
proscription on corporate spending may have little effect on corpo-
rate influence since a corporation may use treasury fumds to create
a political action committee (PAC) to solicit funds from corporate
officers and directors. The corporate PAC may then donate or
spend directly to influence an election.8 6
Third, and most importantly, Austin is in deep tension with
Buckley. Although Austin used Buckley's language of preventing
"corruption," its notion that corruption results from the use of cam-
paign war chests that "have little or no correlation to the public's
support for the .. political ideas espoused"87 is really a concern
about money-based inequality of influence.88 So long as Buckley re-
mains the leading case in the field, any effort to extend Austin to
other wealthy spenders and to initiative elections is likely to run
head-on into Buckley. Until the conflict between Buckley and Austin
is resolved, Austin is unlikely to have much generative power.8 9
The challenge for reformers is to persuade the Court to re-
think the campaign finance field along the lines suggested in Aus-
tin-to focus on the "corruption" of the political process that
occurs when money obtained in the domain of private economic
transactions is directed without restriction into the political process.
Although this is more a question of money-based inequality of influ-
ence than corruption as traditionally defined, the rhetoric of cor-
ruption may prove to be more effective than arguments phrased in
terms of equality. Unless and until Buckley is replaced by Austin, or
by some other approach 90 that permits restrictions on campaign fi-
nance activities for reasons other than preventing the corruption of
candidates, there is not much prospect for judicial approval of re-
SeeJoyce Purnick, Speak Softly But Cany A Big Wallt, N.Y. Tims, Nov. 18, 1996, at
B1.
85. See ZisK, supra note 42, at 90.
86. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.
87. Id.
88. Austin provides little support for limits intended to equalize spending by
electoral antagonists. Under Austin's approach, if a candidate or initiative commit-
tee received financial support from a large number of donors, there would be no
basis for limiting spending even if, without a limit, the opposition would be
outspent.
89. In its most recent campaign finance case, Colorado Republican Fed. Cam-
paign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n., 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996), the Court returned to
the Buckley approach of defining corruption in terms of the corruption of
candidates.
90. Another doctrinal approach would be to devalue campaign expenditures,
treating them as less than core political speech and thus as not deserving of the
highest level of constitutional protection.
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forms that would either limit contributions to initiative campaign
committees or would limit the sources or sums of money in initia-
tive campaigns.
III.
THE PROBLEM OF IMPLEMENTATION
Even if campaign finance doctrine was reconceptualized to
permit greater restriction on contributions and expenditures, it
would still be more difficult to implement reform in the initiative
context than in candidate campaigns. Moreover, the most impor-
tant equalizing reform currently permitted under Budkey, public
funding, would be difficult to implement in the initiative context.
Once again, these difficulties stem from a central feature of initia-
tive elections-the absence of candidates and parties.
In candidate elections, private money flows from donors
(either directly or via intermediary organizations) to candidates or
parties; from parties to candidates; from the candidates and parties
to direct communication to the voters; and sometimes from private
parties, also for direct communication to the voters (so-called "in-
dependent expenditures"). With the exception of independent ex-
penditures, the candidates and parties are the pivotal nodes in the
system. But there are no candidates or parties in the initiative set-
ting. When initiative proponents qualify a measure for the ballot, it
is the proposition that goes on the ballot, not the qualifying com-
mittee. Yet the proposition per se does not receive or spend money
in the general election campaign. Instead, initiative campaigns are
conducted by individuals, organizations, and committees with an
interest in the outcome but who are not themselves on the ballot.
This has implications for the ability to enforce contribution and ex-
penditure restrictions or to supply candidates with public funds.
* Contribution limits. Any limit on how much a donor can give to
a campaign committee is likely to be meaningless in the ballot-
proposition context. If a law were to limit how much an individual
could give to a committee, multiple committees would spring up in
support of the same position. Unlike candidate elections, in which
candidates have to go through an often-onerous process to qualify
for the ballot, there are no comparable hurdles restricting the for-
mation of initiative committees. Nor is it clear that a state could
limit each side to one committee. In the absence of a ballot-quali-
fied candidate, who is to decide which committee is the one permis-
sible campaign committee? This is particularly true for the "no"
side of an initiative. Whereas the organization mounting the peti-
tion drive that gets the initiative measure placed on the ballot could
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be the designated "yes" committee, there is typically not an official
"no" committee. There is certainly no formal process for the
designation of an official "no" committee. Although in most initia-
tive campaigns to date there has been just one campaign organiza-
tion on each side, the history of campaign finance reform indicates
that new laws, by creating new incentives, frequently lead to
changes in the way campaigns are financed. 9'
A state could address this problem by imposing an aggregate
cap on all donations in connection with a ballot proposition. But
that would simply limit the small and moderate givers. Wealthy in-
terests, professional associations, and firms could simply spend di-
rectly on communications with the voters.92 In the candidate
context, there may be incentives for donors to give directly to a
candidate in order to build up good will and influence with that
candidate. In the initiative context, however, there would be no
comparable incentive for big money to donate as opposed to engag-
ing in direct expenditures.
*Expenditure Limits. Given the difficulties of contribution lim-
its, a campaign finance reform based on limits would require some
kind of expenditure ceiling. This would be a more dramatic depar-
ture from the current regime. While contribution limits are pro-
scribed in ballot-proposition elections, they are permitted in
candidate elections, and spending limits are generally unconstitu-
tional.93 Even if, under a reformulated constitutional doctrine,
spending limits could withstand legal challenge, they would be hard
to apply and enforce in the ballot- proposition setting. In the ab-
sence of candidates and parties, initiative elections are open to par-
ticipation by a wide range of individuals, organizations, and groups
on an ad hoc basis. Although there may be two sides to every initia-
91. See Lowenstein, supra note 9, at 581 n.281. Even ithout the incentive of
campaign finance laws, ballot proposition campaigns have sometimes had more
than one campaign committee on a side. See id. at 620.
92. Professor Lowenstein suggests that this would still be an improvement
from a reform perspective because direct spending would result in greater disclo-
sure to the voters of the source of the spending. See id. at 599. With this reform, a
corporation or an interest group would no longer be able to use an organization
with an anodyne name, like "Citizens for Good Government," to disguise its role in
funding the opposition to an initiative. I suspect that Professor Lowenstein over-
states the value of disclosure, in particular, the degree to which voters are influ-
enced by their knowledge of the sources of campaign money in their voting
decisions. See David W. Adamany & George E. Agree, PoLrn. m. MoNw. A SmALT-
EGY FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCING iN A~mac.x 83-115 (1975); ZisK, supra note 42, at 262.
93. The exception is Austin's approval of limits on spending by corporations
in candidate elections.
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five, there is no one state-qualified entity on either side to make or
control that side's campaign. Again, this is particularly true of the
"no" side, which has no contact with the state during the process of
qualifying a measure for the ballot. But even on the "yes" side, the
right to campaign for the proposition is not limited to the group
that initially sought to place the measure on the ballot.
The absence of a single, official campaign committee-
equivalent to a candidate or party-for each side in an initiative
election will make policing spending ceilings far more difficult. In
effect, all ballot proposition spenders are functionally equivalent to
independent committees in the candidate-election context. In the
absence of a candidate, it might not be clear which is the principal
committee coordinating campaign activity. Spending caps that ap-
ply to individual committees would just create an incentive to create
multiple committees. The wealthiest individuals or groups with a
stake in the election would be the ones most able to form separate
committees or spend directly. Therefore, in candidate elections, a
candidate or party might discourage independent committees in
order to maintain central control over the campaign's message, but
there would be no comparable central entity in initiative elections.
Moreover, multiple committees, with multiple arguments, might be
helpful, particularly for those on the "no" side, in giving voters a
range of reasons for making up their minds.
Thus, spending limits would have to apply not only to individ-
ual committees but to all spending on each side of an initiative cam-
paign. This might mean that if there is a proposition for which
different groups have different reasons for taking the same posi-
tion-and each wants to get its distinct position to the voters-
spending by those who got their message out early could result in
other groups being barred from speaking. This is a potentially
troublesome result from a free speech perspective.9 4 More practi-
cally, spending ceilings would require vigilant monitoring by elec-
tion administrators who would need to keep a running tally of all
expenditures from multiple committees on each side.
The difficulty of imposing and enforcing contribution and ex-
penditure limits on multiple committees on the same side of a bal-
lot proposition election may be compounded when there is more
than one proposition dealing with the same issue on a particular
ballot. This already is a common phenomenon. California has had
94. Cf Robyn R. Polashuk, Protecting the Public Debate: The Validity of the Fairness
Doctrine in Ballot Initiative Elections, 41 UCLA L. REv. 391, 438 (1993) (noting that
the existence of multiple viewpoints on each side occasionally posed problems for
broadcasters subject to the Fairness Doctrine).
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elections in which, in a given year, there were five competing pro-
positions dealing with insurance reform;95 or two propositions of-
fering different methods of regulating health maintenance
organizations;96 or even two conflicting proposals for campaign fi-
nance reform.97 This has occurred in other states as well. 98 Inter-
est groups often use competing propositions strategically notjust to
offer the voters alternatives that the particular interest group finds
more appealing than the initial proposition, but also to distract or
confuse the electorate or to tacitly undo a popular initiative.99 A
spending cap could provide an additional strategic incentive to
qualify competing initiatives, since each initiative would presumably
be subject to a separate spending limit.1 00
Again, this is a tactic most available to the wealthiest interest
groups. A group opposed to Proposition 1 could qualify Proposi-
tions 2 and 3, and thereby triple the amount of money it could
spend on the subject common to the three propositions. Presuma-
bly only one-third of the expenditures for ads calling for "no" on
"1" and "yes" on "2" and "3" would count towards the cap on Propo-
sition 1, even though the purpose of the entire campaign would be
to defeat Proposition 1. Similarly, an ad addressed to one proposi-
tion could have an effect on voter attitudes toward a competing
proposition, yet it might not count toward the spending cap on the
second proposition.
95. See Bill Zimmerman, Insurance Referendum: $60 Million War in California,
NATION, Nov. 7, 1988 at 449; Kenneth Reich, Consumer Groups Badk Props. 100, 103,
L.A Tnms, Oct. 25, 1988, at 25.
96. See Nicolosi, supra note 82, at A22.
97. See Comparing the Initiatives, L.A. TiMEs, May 24, 1988, at Part 2, at 4.
98. See ZtsK, supra note 42, at 71 (describing three competing tax reduction
measures on the 1978 Michigan ballot).
99. See, e.g., Eule, supra note 58, at 1517; Polashuk, supra note 94, at 410
n.1ll.
100. To qualify for the ballot, a proposition needs to get signatures from
some percentage of the state's electorate. In large states this "is mostly a commer-
cial venture" involving the use of paid solicitors who are compensated on a per
signature basis. In smaller states, signature-gathering may succeed as an "amateur
enterprise." Collins and Oesterle, supra note 47, at 70-71. Wealthy interests are
likely to find it particularly easy to qualify strategic initiatives in smaller states.
"Currently, a single citizen with an extra $40,000, fifty cents a signature for eighty
thousand signatures, has a good chance of putting an initiative on the [Colorado]
state-wide ballot using paid solicitors." Id. at 75. The ability of wealthy interests to
qualify their ballot propositions is, thus, aided by the Supreme Court's inalidation
of the restriction on the use of paid solicitors. Se Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414
(1988).
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A candidate's strategic support of additional candidates is rela-
tively rare-perhaps because candidates are concerned that the di-
versionary candidate might win, or, if the additional candidate is
too weak to win, because the tactic would seem too transparent to
succeed. In the ballot proposition context, however, supporters of
additional initiatives might be quite happy if their diversionary
measures passed. Moreover, multiple initiatives might be less open
to charges of strategic manipulation because each measure would
technically stand or fall in a separate election, and because each
would present a slightly different regulatory alternative to the
voters.
*Public Funding. With spending caps difficult to enforce, an al-
ternative means of promoting equalization in initiative elections is
public funding. Public funding assures each side in an election a
basic level of support for getting its message out, and thereby
reduces the significance of private funding inequalities. As a strat-
egy for leveling up rather than leveling down, public funding is
compatible with current constitutional doctrine. 10 1 Moreover, the
provision of public funds can be an incentive to get candidates to
agree to expenditure limits. In federal elections, public funding is
available for qualifying candidates in the presidential primaries and
for the general election. In the primaries, funds are provided on a
matching basis; for a candidate who raises a certain threshold
amount of money, the federal government will match a portion of
the additional funds the candidate raises privately. 10 2 In the gen-
eral election, the candidates of the major parties receive a large, flat
grant and are required to forego the use of private donations.103
For both primaries and general elections, public funds are contin-
gent on a candidate's acceptance of spending limits.
101. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 at 85-109.
102. Presidential primary matching funds are available for candidates who
raise $5,000 in each of twenty states in contributions from individuals of $250 or
less. The federal government matches each contribution to qualified candidates
from individuals up to $250 per contributor. Candidates who agree to accept
matching funds are also subject to spending limitations. See ALEXANDER & COR-
,ADo, supra note 11, at 18. A candidate who does poorly in consecutive primary
elections may cease to be eligible for public funds. See 26 U.S.C. § 9033 (1994).
103. A major party is defined as a party whose candidate for president re-
ceived 25% or more of the popular vote in the last presidential election. See 26
U.S.C. § 9002(6) (1994). A candidate of a party that received 5% but less than
25% of the vote in the last presidential election receives a fraction of the major
party grant based on how close to 25% of the vote that party received. See 26
U.S.C. §§ 9002(7), 9004(a) (2) (1994). Again, to be eligible this candidate also has
to agree to abide by spending limits. See 26 U.S.C. § 9003 (1994).
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The absence of ballot-qualified candidates and parties makes it
more difficult to implement a public funding scheme for initiatives.
Again, there is the question of who is to receive the public funds,
particularly on the "no" side. Presumably, some state agency would
have to make a determination, pursuant to some statutory criteria,
as to which "no" committee is to receive the "no" money. A basic
question is whether public funds would be provided to one commit-
tee on each side-presumably the committee that demonstrates the
most popular support' 0L-or to all committees whose support
crosses a certain threshold. If the former, then the state would be
in the unattractive position of anointing the official opposition
without benefit of a "primary" election or some other prior electo-
ral qualification of the organization. Although state officials in
states with voter handbooks may choose which organization or or-
ganizations supply the arguments to be included in the handbook,
state designation of an official opposition gives the state a much
greater role in structuring initiative elections than has traditionally
been the case.105 Moreover, if the state funds just one committee,
then public funding could not be used to support spending limits,
since other committees on each side would be free to raise and
spend money. If public funds are provided to more than one com-
mittee on a side, on some kind of matching basis, as in the presi-
dential primary system, it would be much harder to assure parity of
funding for the two sides, and the side with greater qualifying pri-
vate support might also receive more public funds.
In calling for public funding of initiative campaigns, Professor
Lowenstein has contended that "the administrative problems are
real, but they can be overcome."10 6 Nevertheless, public funding is
less likely to achieve equalization in the initiative setting because
104. In the absence of an election to choose a "no" committee, the most plau-
sible way of determining which has the most support is by looking at the donations
the committees have received, possibly giving weight to the number of donors as
well as to the amounts donated.
105. When the Fairness Doctrine was adopted-requiring broadcasters to
provide both sides in an initiative election with a reasonable opportunity to pres-
ent their views, including free time to the side that could not afford it if the broad-
caster accepted paid ads from the other side-broadcasters were free to choose
which viewpoints would be presented and who would present them. St Polashuk,
supra note 94, at 396-97 & 442 n.25.
106. Lowenstein, supra note 9, at 583. He would authorize the legal propo-
nent of the initiative to determine who receives the "yes" funds and have the state
designate the "no" committee that was most successful in raising private funds as
the recipient of the public "no" money. See id. at 581-83. See also Polashuk, supra
note 94, at 439 (proposing to authorize an administrative agency to determine who
would receive free broadcasting time under a revived Fairness Doctrine).
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the possibility of multiple committees makes it more difficult to use
public funds as an incentive for the acceptance of spending limits.
In addition, the likely use of a matching funds model assures a role
for private funding. Funding just one committee on each side
could permit equal subsidies for the two sides but would put the
state in the unusual and potentially awkward role of designating the
official opposition. Even then, the provision of public funds to one
committee could not limit the ability of other committees working
independently on the same side to raise and spend private funds. 10 7
An alternative form of public funding, not adopted in any juris-
diction, is vouchers-the provision of an equal sum of money or
coupons to each voter-that could only be used to fund political
activity.' 08 Vouchers would avoid the necessity of state designation
of official campaign committees; in that sense, they are more con-
sistent with the open, unstructured nature of initiative elections
than public grants to campaign committees. Yet vouchers present
their own difficulties. The size of an election voucher would pre-
sumably be based, in part, on the number of contests in an election
campaign. Whereas the number of elective offices to be filled is
usually relatively small and quite predictable, any number of initia-
tives can be proposed and qualified for the ballot. Adapting the
voucher system to direct democracy would require the size of the
voucher to rise and fall with an ever-shifting number of ballot
propositions.
Vouchers, like matching grants, would be better at equalizing
voter influence over electoral outcomes than assuring equal spend-
ing on both sides of an initiative campaign. The position benefit-
ing from more widespread or intense support at the outset of the
campaign would receive more funding. It appears that it will be
quite difficult to achieve both strands of equalization-equal spend-
ing on an issue and equal voter influence over electoral outcome-
in the direct democracy setting.10 9
107. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action
Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1984).
108. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian!
Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1996).
109. Reliance on vouchers also raises questions concerning the solicitation of
voters for their vouchers. There has to be some campaigning in order to inform
the voters who the candidates are and what the ballot propositions contain, and
then to persuade voters to donate their vouchers to a particular side. Presumably
campaigning for vouchers will entail the use of some private funds.
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IV.
CONCLUSION
The difficulties of reforming campaign finance in initiative
elections tell us a little bit about both initiatives and campaign fi-
nance. With respect to initiatives, the hallmark of direct democ-
racy-the absence of a role for candidates and parties-may be an
Achilles' heel when it comes to justifying and implementing re-
forms. Under current doctrine, the most effective justification for
restrictions on the use of private funds in campaigns is the preven-
tion of the corruption of candidates. But in the direct democracy
context, there are no candidates. Even if doctrine were to change
to permit regulation that would promote equalization, the open-
ended nature of initiative campaigns and the central role of private
individuals and ad hoc organizations would make it more difficult
to enforce restrictions. The absence of ballot-qualified candidates
and parties and the absence of electoral institutions for determin-
ing who controls a ballot-proposition campaign would also make it
more difficult to select the recipients of public funds or to use pub-
lic funding as a means of equalizing campaign spending.' 0
The difficulties in adapting campaign finance reform to initia-
tives may also tell us something about the difficulties of promoting
political equality in a relatively open political system. The two
strands of equality-equality of spending and equality of influ-
ence-may not both be achievable unless there are some restric-
tions on who can participate in the electoral process. Only in a
system of equal government grants to electoral antagonists, with pri-
vate spending proscribed, can both goals be achieved: in such a
system both sides would be equally funded, and use of the public
fisc would eliminate the possibility of unequal private influence. In
the initiative setting, this would involve both government designa-
tion of campaign committees and a prohibition on spending by
other committees. Currently, the latter would be unconstitutional,
and the former might be awkward in light of the traditionally open-
ended nature of direct democracy.
The initiative example also suggests something about the diffi-
culty of achieving both strands of equality in the candidate-election
context. The more the electoral system is open to participation, the
more difficult equalization will be to achieve. Public funding can
110. Other reforms, such as those that would reduce the cost of campaign
communications by requiring broadcasters to sell ads at lower rates, would not
appear to encounter any special problems in the initiative settings. However such
reforms would probably have a more modest effect in promoting equality.
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be provided to ballot-qualified candidates or parties, as in the presi-
dential general election. But unless limits are placed on the electo-
ral activities of committees, organizations, and individuals that act
independently of candidates, both equality of spending and equal-
ity of influence can be subverted. In fact, it is likely to be particu-
larly difficult to persuade the Supreme Court to accept limits on
independent spending-the element of candidate elections that
most resembles initiative elections. Moreover, public funding
through flat, equal grants to candidates is really only plausible for
elections structured by major parties with proven records of sup-
port. In the absence of something like a major party nomination
process which demonstrates that a candidate has a high level of sup-
port at the beginning of a campaign, public funds are likely to be
on a matching grant or voucher basis. Indeed, the more we want to
encourage openness-through the use of primaries to select party
nominees, and by easing access to the ballot for third-party and in-
dependent candidates-the more likely public-campaign funding
will turn on the candidates' ability to draw support. Matching
funds or vouchers may promote equality of influence, but they will
not lead to equal spending as long as there are differences in the
initial level of support for different sides in an election.
The difficulties of campaign reform for initiatives-the electo-
ral mechanism most open to participation-are merely an extreme
case of the general problem of financing campaigns in a political
system relatively open to participation by people and interests other
than professional politicians and parties. They also demonstrate
that in a large and complex society, in which communication with
the electorate is costly and requires considerable resources but in
which those resources are distributed in dramatically unequal ways,
a relatively open political structure need not result in redistributive
public policies.
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